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Abstract This paper examines factors affecting the stock
price, net proceeds, and subsequent survival of biopharma-
ceutical firms that have gone public between 1996 and 2007
in the USA. We find that the financial condition of biophar-
maceutical firms going public has deteriorated. The results
also indicate that the financial condition of the firm prior to
its going public and the intermediaries associated with the
firm and initial public offering have little effect on first-day
price increases. The findings, however, indicate that several
of these financial indicators, and having prestigious under-
writers, do have a significant effect on the amount of net
proceeds received by the firm.
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Introduction
Expenditures on new drugs and therapeutics created by
biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms (collectively
termed here as “biopharmaceuticals”) represent an increas-
ing portion of US citizens’ healthcare dollar [1, 2]. The costs
associated with bringing a new pharmaceutical product to
market has been studied extensively, with recent estimates
of costs related to new pharmaceutical and biotechnology
products in the USA now exceeding one billion dollars each
[3]. In addition to these costs, the time from product
conception to market can be 12 to 15 years or more with
high failure rates common among these products and firms
[4, 5]. The reward for firms succeeding in this market sector
can be significant [6], however, with many US pharmaceu-
tical firms experiencing double-digit annual growth rates
over the past decade or more [7].
Because of these factors, firms seeking entry into this
market typically receive funding from multiple sources [8,
9]. Historically, established pharmaceutical firms have been
the single largest provider of these funds [10, 11]. Another
source of funding for many new biopharmaceutical firms is
from the public markets by way of an initial public offering
(IPO). Within the IPO literature, previous empirical work
has primarily focused on the general population of US IPOs
[12], with post-IPO stock price performance being studied at
length over the past few decades [13].
We know far less about biopharmaceutical firms’ IPO
performance as this has received little attention in the
literature [14]. To address this deficiency, this paper
examines pre-IPO financial indicators and their relation-
ship to aftermarket (e.g., NASDAQ) performance and
survival of US biopharmaceutical firms that went public
in the 12-year period from 1996 through 2007. Our
purpose is to explore changes in financial condition of
these biopharmaceutical IPOs over time and to investi-
gate whether these pre-IPO financial indicators correlate
with short- and long-term changes in this market. Among
others, Ritter and Welch [15] have encouraged further
work in subsamples of the general IPO market to help
clarify our understanding of these issues. This should be
of interest to scholars and biopharmaceutical firms as
these issues relate to efficiencies in these markets [15,
16], with inefficient markets potentially reducing the
funds available to finance new drugs and therapies. Com-
mentators [8, 17, 18] have noted that recent events in the
capital markets indeed may have lessened access to
resources for new firms and technologies.
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In the general IPO literature, the performance issue of
increases in first-day returns, known as underpricing, has
received significant attention [19]. Ritter and Welch [15]
noted that between 1980 and 2001, US IPOs’ first-day stock
prices increased on an average of 18.8 %. Loughran and
Ritter [20] observed that between 1990 and 1998, IPO
issuers would have gained an extra $27 billion in net pro-
ceeds had their initial stock price (known as the offer price)
reflected the price the stock sold at the end of its first day of
trading. Loughran and Ritter ([20], p. 414), however, found
that most of this money “left on the table” comes from “a
minority of IPOs.” In a different study, Loughran and Ritter
[21] found great variation of underpricing within this period.
For instance, they find that first-day average stock prices
increased 7 % during the 1980s, 15 % from 1990 through
1998, and 65 % during the internet bubble of 1999 and
2000. Despite this increase in first-day stock price, Peristiani
and Hong [16] studying all US IPOs between 1980 and
2000, found that the quality of pre-IPO financial indicators
had gradually deteriorated over this time period.
Most of the published research on biopharmaceutical
IPOs has been specific to biotechnology firms. The majority
of this IPO research has examined biotechnology firms that
went public in the 1990s prior to the migration of venture
capital into this market sector following the internet bubble.
Beginning around the year 2000, the biotechnology and
medical device industries became the largest areas for ven-
ture capital investment. These two industries received 31 %
of all venture capital investment or $9.1 billion in 2007 [22].
By the end of 2007, there were 386 publicly traded biotech-
nology firms in the USA [23]. About a third of these
biotechnology firms went public after the internet bubble.
Publicly traded biotechnology firms have a total market
capitalization of about $300 billion [24]. We study both
biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms as these industries
are merging. Studies close to our own remain sparse, how-
ever, with extant research differing in terms of setting, time
period, and variables.
Our sample includes biopharmaceutical firms that have
gone public since the time of much of the extant literature on
the general IPO market and biotechnology firms was written
and since the increased migration of funds by venture capital
investors. We look at the biopharmaceutical’s financial and
intermediaries’ variables relationship to (1) changes in stock
prices at multiple time periods and by different types (e.g.,
drug development firms and complements), (2) the net pro-
ceeds raised by the initial offer, and (3) IPO survivability.
Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses
The valuation of IPOs is one of the most intriguing phe-
nomena undertaken by academicians and investors alike.
There are two broad valuation approaches in the general
IPO literature. The first approach is one in which firm value
is determined based on its own fundamentals without con-
sidering other firms, and the second is one in which firm
value is estimated indirectly by prices of comparable firms
[25]. Our study has elements of both approaches.
Frequently mentioned in these valuation approaches are
the two interrelated issues of timing and costs. The issue of
“timing” is concerned with the relationship of new stock
issuance relative to the performance of the average existing
publicly traded firm [26]. Practitioners and researchers both
are interested in whether or not there is a better time to issue
stock. IPO markets typically are considered either “hot” or
“cold,” with much of the extant research focusing on “hot
markets” [27]. Hot markets occur when the stock price of
new issues rapidly increases above their offering prices and
last for an extended period. The findings of the hot market
literature related to performance are inconclusive, however.
For example, early work by Ibbotson and Jaffe [28] suggests
that IPOs might be better off going public in a cold market.
Ritter [27], however, noted that the IPO market was seg-
mented with various segments of the market performing
differently. Williams and Young [29] noted that the biophar-
maceutical IPO market between 1996 and 2003 was “hotter”
than the general US IPO market in only 1 year. Our paper is
only secondarily concerned with the timing or hot markets
issue.
Issues surrounding IPO costs include direct cash
expenses such as legal and accounting [30], investment
bank’s commission [31], and mispricing [32, 33]. Research
on the costs surrounding the mispricing of new issues has
received a great deal of attention. This research is concerned
with establishing a price at which to sell the shares on the
common market and involves an iterative set of negotiations
among the firm going public, the underwriters, and after-
market investors [33]. In its most basic form, pre-IPO
investors typically sell their stock to investment banks
(e.g., underwriters) just prior to the IPO at a specified price
(called the offer price). The investment banks then sell this
stock in the aftermarket to the general public (e.g., institu-
tional investors and individuals). The difference between the
offer price and the price that the general public pays in the
aftermarket creates the mispricing issue. When the general
public persistently pays above or below the offer price then
this creates a hot or cold market.
Mispricing can take the form of “underpricing” which is
when the stock price at the close of the first day of trading is
higher than the offer price, or “overpricing” which is when
the stock price at the close of the first day of trading is lower
than the offer price. Most studies have found underpricing to
be the predominate form of mispricing [34]. As stated
earlier, Loughran and Ritter [20] noted that between 1990
and 1998, pre-IPO investors relinquished $27 billion due to
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the underpricing of their stock. Subsequently, Nimalendran,
Ritter, and Zhang [35] found that during the internet bubble
years of 1999 and 2000, pre-IPO investors would have
gained an additional $63.5 billion had it not been for
underpricing.
Several explanations have been put forward to explain
the underpricing issue. We touch on only a few of these
here, and note that Ritter and Welch [15] provide a review of
the theories associated with underpricing. Rock’s [36] “win-
ners curse” is one of the early explanations and states that
informed investors have access to the true value of new
issues while uninformed investors initially subscribe indis-
criminately to all new issues. However, realizing that they
will be paying a premium for the stock, the uninformed
investor subsequently chooses to stay out of the market. In
order to ensure that all the IPO shares sell at the IPO, the
new issuing firm has to underprice its shares to entice the
uninformed investors. A second explanation is put forward
by Tinic [37] who hypothesizes that new issuers underprice
shares to act as insurance against legal liability. Shiller [38]
proposes that the IPO market is subject to “fads” that affect
market prices, with underwriters and other investors moving
from one area of investment to the next. Baron [39] notes
that underpricing lowers the underwriter’s marketing costs.
Signaling theory [40] also has been used in numerous
studies [9, 41] to describe IPO activity, with it being sug-
gested that the endorsement of prestigious underwriters
influence the investor’s view of a high-quality new issue
and thus encourages underpricing. Loughran and Ritter [20]
use prospect theory [42] to suggest that pre-IPO investors
are more tolerant of excessive underpricing if they simulta-
neously learn about aftermarket valuation that is higher than
what they expected. This is to say that the greater the recent
increase in their wealth, the less is the bargaining effort of
pre-IPO investors in their negotiations over the offer price
with the underwriters. Our purpose here is to note that (1)
underpricing is recognized as a common phenomenon with-
in the general population of IPOs, (2) underwriters tend to
suppress offer prices, and (3) there is little consensus in the
literature as to “whether underpricing is a preferred or un-
welcome outcome of the IPO process” ([19], p. 274).
Figure 1 illustrates the mispricing issue for biopharma-
ceutical firms. In the first half of Fig. 1, we have separated
firms that are primarily engaged in drug/therapy develop-
ment from firms that are complements (see explanation in
“Sources and Construction of the Dataset”). From Fig. 1, we
can see that both drug development and complement IPOs
experienced wide swings in mispricing of their stock but
less so more recently. The typical firm during this 12-year
period (N0215) experienced 16.2 % underpricing. The sec-
ond half of Fig. 1 shows the changes in stock price on
certain anniversary dates (e.g., 1 year after IPO) relative to
its initial offer price. Here, too, we see wide swings in
changes in stock price. The typical firm whose stock traded
1 year or more (N0189) experienced a 1.6 % increase in
stock price on its first-year IPO anniversary date relative to
its initial offer price. This compares to the typical firm
whose stock traded 3 years or more (N0133) experiencing
a 14.1 % stock price increase from its initial offer price on
its third-year IPO anniversary.
There are only a handful of studies in this setting that are
close in nature to the current study. For example, Guo, Lev,
and Zhou [25] examine financial and nonfinancial informa-
tion to explain the initial offer value (i.e., product of initial
offer price and expected number of shares outstanding), end
offer value (i.e., product of actual offer price and expected
number of shares outstanding), and aftermarket value (i.e.,
product of closing price and total amount raised on the first
day of trading) of 122 biotechnology IPOs from the 1990s.
They find that nonfinancial measures play an important role
in explaining offer values and aftermarket value. Williams et
al. [14] study governance and agency issues related to
wealth creation (e.g., 3-year average returns on assets and
equity) in 182 biotechnology and healthcare IPOs between
1996 and 1999. They find little relationship between these
variables.
Tan and Lim [43] study 486 biotechnology firms (not
IPOs) from 1990 to 2001 to determine if accounting variables
reflect information used by investors in valuing a firms’ equity
over numerous time periods. They find the accounting varia-
bles to be value relevant but with little explanatory power.
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Fig. 1 Changes in stock prices. Negative numbers represent percent
increase of stock price at the end of period above offer price
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among board characteristics, previous IPO underpricing, offer
price, and expected offer amount raised on 182 healthcare and
biotechnology IPOs that went public from 1996 through 1999.
They find significant relationships between certain board
characteristics and offer price. Xu [44] examines 194 biotech-
nology firms (not IPOs) to see if research and development
(R&D) strategy (i.e., pursuing a diversified or concentrated
portfolio of drugs or therapies) affects daily stock price vola-
tility. Xu [44] finds that R&D strategy does have an effect on
stock price volatility. Thus, there exists the beginnings of
research around this topic in this setting; however, there is
no direct research on mispricing, amount actually raised dur-
ing the entire IPO process, or long-term performance and
survival.
Ultimately, underpricing is the result of aftermarket
investors valuing the stock at a higher price than the under-
writers do. Some researchers [20, 45] argue that under-
writers not only have a propensity to keep the initial offer
prices low but are also incentivized to underprice IPOs.
Furthermore, Tan and Lim ([43], p. 233) note that many
view a biotechnology firm’s stock as “speculative in nature
and resembl[ing] a gamble.” This is because the technology
within much of this industry is still developing [46], with
little knowledge of the true product development costs [47],
or as Robbins-Roth [48] observes the discovery process for
many of these products remains serendipitous.
Given that mispricing does occur in this market sector,
the great uncertainty of technological development in these
industries and for each firm, and the paucity of information
about the firm available to the investor, we believe that it is
reasonable to expect to see aftermarket investors relying
heavily on financial information to value the stock—specif-
ically that information found in the firm’s audited financial
statements. Leone, Rock, and Willenborg [49] note that
investors do use data in the firm’s prospectus, especially
how they tend to use the funds of the IPO. Thus, we agree
with Loughran and Ritter [20] and others that underwriters
for various reasons tend to keep the offer price low, and we
propose that aftermarket investors with little information (or
ability to interpret information in this field [50]) other than
financial data tend to bid up firms in relatively better finan-
cial condition compared with other firms in this industry.
Hence, we expect to see value-relevant results related to
mispricing and financial indicators similar to Tan and Lim’s
[43] results related to the non-IPO biotechnology firms’
stock prices. Thus, we hypothesize:
H1. All else equal, firms in a better financial condition
will experience greater underpricing than firms in a
lesser financial condition.
Also implicit in this literature is the belief that the mea-
sure of a successful IPO is not necessarily limited to the
offer or stock price but includes the amount raised by the
IPO [9, 20]. At this stage, it is primarily the funds from the
IPO that allow the firm to survive and pursue its purpose.
Regardless of the pre-IPO investors’ ability to limit the
amount of funds left on the table in terms of the difference
in offer and aftermarket price, we would expect to see
biopharmaceutical firms seeking to maximize the amount
raised during the IPO, with firms in better financial condi-
tion in a more able position to do this. Loughran and Ritter
[20] suggest that pre-IPO investors do not get upset about
underpricing as long as their overall wealth increases, with
underwriters determining not just the offer price but the
volume sold as well [15]. The total amount raised in an
IPO can be considered one factor in this wealth creation
process. Thus, we hypothesize:
H2. All else equal, firms in a better financial condition
will receive a greater amount of net proceeds from the
initial public offering than firms in a lesser financial
condition.
Notwithstanding the above, not all financial indicators
may be of the same value for all firms, industries, and
investors. For biopharmaceutical companies, expenditures
on research and development may be viewed as exemplify-
ing the pre-IPO owner’s commitment to the firm. Addition-
ally, several studies on technology firms [51, 52] have
shown that the market is favorable to expenditures on re-
search and development. This especially may be true for
IPOs that are engaged in drug/therapy development more so
than for other firms in this industry. Thus, we hypothesize:
H3a. All else equal, firms that invest a greater amount in
R&D in the year prior to the IPO will experience a
greater amount of underpricing than firms that invest a
lesser amount on R&D.
H3b. All else equal, drug development firms that invest
a greater amount in R&D in the year prior to the IPO
will experience a greater amount of underpricing than
drug development firms that invest a lesser amount on
R&D.
H4a. All else equal, firms that invest a greater amount in
R&D in the year prior to the IPO will receive a greater
amount of net proceeds from the initial public offering
than firms that invest a lesser amount on R&D.
H4b. All else equal, drug development firms that invest
a greater amount in R&D in the year prior to the IPO
will receive a greater amount of net proceeds from the
initial public offering than drug development firms that
invest a lesser amount on R&D.
The general IPO literature has also found intermediaries
to play a significant role in IPO development and pricing.
This literature relates to the involvement of venture capital-
ists and underwriters. Within the literature, both parties have
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been purported to send signals of high-quality investment
opportunities [9, 19]. In particular, underwriter reputation
has been found to be correlated with favorable offerings
[25]. Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt [53] found IPOs
between 1980 and 1998 with underwriters with higher rep-
utations being associated with firms having higher offering
prices and also greater survival rates. They do not include
financial indicators in their study. Venture capitalists also
have been seen as having a significant positive impact on
technological innovation [54] that act as an active bridge or
intermediary between optimistic entrepreneurs and conser-
vative institutional investors [55]. Thus, we hypothesize:
H5a. All else equal, firms with venture capital involve-
ment will experience greater underpricing than firms
without venture capital involvement.
H5b. All else equal, firms with venture capital involve-
ment will receive a greater amount of net proceeds from
the initial public offering than firms without venture
capital involvement.
H6a. All else equal, firms with underwriters with greater
reputations will experience more underpricing than
firms with underwriters with lesser reputations.
H6b. All else equal, firms with underwriters with greater
reputations will receive a greater amount of net pro-
ceeds from the initial public offering than firms with
lesser underwriter reputations.
Recently, the long-run performance of IPOs has also gained
attention in the literature, as this issue relates to the question of
efficiency in public markets [15]. Efficient market proponents
argue that once an IPO is publicly traded, it is similar to any
other stock and thus the aftermarket stock price should reflect
the stock’s intrinsic value [51, 56]. Overall, IPOs have under-
performed compared with other publicly traded firms [57].
According to Ritter and Welch [15], there is a conventional
wisdom that the quality of firms deteriorates as more firms
issue stock. We believe that this might also be true with
biopharmaceutical firms in that the venture capital and IPO
markets gained interest in this area after the internet bubble. In
addition, as this is a research and capital-intense market sector
[1], we believe that firms with greater resources may be able to
survive longer. Thus, we hypothesize:
H7a. All else equal, firms with better pre-IPO financial
indicators will perform better in terms of changes in
stock price in the long run than firms with lesser pre-
IPO financial indicators.
H7b. All else equal, the quality of biopharmaceutical
firms as measured by pre-IPO financial indicators will
have deteriorated over time.
H8a. All else equal, firms with better pre-IPO financial
indicators will be more likely to survive than firms with
lesser pre-IPO financial indicators.
H8b. All else equal, firms that raise a greater amount of
net proceeds at the time of the IPO will be more likely
to survive than firms that raise a lesser amount of net
proceeds at the time of the IPO.
Sources and Construction of the Dataset
We collected names of biopharmaceutical IPOs from the
Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) internet site
and several other internet sources (e.g., Bio.org, Bio-
space, BioWorld, Edgar-Online, Ernst & Young, Hoover’s,
and IPO resources). We also read all news articles from
the late 1990s through 31 January 2008 related to
public offerings from www.biospace.com to ensure that
all biopharmaceutical IPOs were captured. Our sample
represents biopharmaceutical firms that went public for
the first time between 1 January 1996 and 31 December
2007. We end our sample in 2007 due to the financial
crisis and the small number of IPOs thereafter. We
exclude foreign firms filing an F-1 foreign firm’s regis-
tration statement and firms that are primarily “plant and
animal” firms. A small number of firms in our sample
appear to be foreign firms. However, if they incorporate
in the USA (usually Delaware) and file an S-1 general
registration statement for US firms, we include them in
the sample. We also exclude firms that went public but
did not receive any direct proceeds from the sale of
their stock (i.e., certain investors were cashing out all or
part of their investment).
The firms in our sample represent firms directly
researching and developing drugs and therapeutics for
humans and complements within this market sector (i.e.,
contract research organizations and firms making comput-
er software specifically for these industries). We include
firms from the following standard industrial classification
(SIC) codes: 2833 (medicinal chemicals and botanical
products), 2834 (pharmaceutical preparations), 2835 (in
vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances), 2836 (biological
products), 3826 (laboratory analytical instruments), 3829
(measuring and controlling devices), 3841 (surgical and
medical instruments and apparatus), 5122 (wholesale
drugs), 7371 (services—computer programming services),
7372 (services—prepackaged software), 7389 (services—
business services), 8071 (services—medical laboratories),
and 8731 (services-commercial physical and biological
research). We review their prospectuses and later filings
to determine if their primary products or services are in
biopharmaceuticals. Other SIC codes are also evaluated.
We separate these firms into two groups. Similar to
Golec and Vernon [58], we label firms with SIC codes
2834 and 2836 as “drugs” and firms with all other SIC
codes as “complements.”
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Variables
Mispricing is the percentage difference in the offer price
and the end of the first day of trading stock price, with
a negative number representing underpricing. We use
the terms underpricing and mispricing interchangeably
below. The offer price derives from the firm’s prospec-
tus. Historical stock price information for firms current-
ly listed with the major US stock exchanges (e.g., New
York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the American Stock
Exchange) is from www.biospace.com, www.finance.yahoo.
com, or www.hotstocked.com. Stock price data for the firms
that had terminated their listings with the SEC (and are no
longer publicly traded) were collected from back issues of the
Wall Street Journal. We use the percentage stock price change
of the firm’s stock 3 years after its IPO (i.e., (offer price − 3rd-
year anniversary stock price)/offer price) as a long-term
performance indicator.
Data related to an IPO’s net proceeds from the initial
public offering are found in the firm’s first quarterly or
annual report after the IPO as filed with the SEC. The net
proceeds data are net of transaction costs, which typically
include attorney’s fees and fees and discounts to under-
writers. As length of time varies per IPO, we rely upon the
firm to tell us how much capital they raised. For example,
Targanta’s quarterly report states: “The net offering pro-
ceeds to the Company were approximately $51.4 million
after deducting underwriting discounts and commissions
and offering expenses of approximately $2.1 million.” Thus,
we use $51.4 million for the net proceeds variable for this
firm.
We use four variables as proxies for financial condition:
revenue generation, research and development expenditures,
return on assets (ROA), and stockholder’s equity. These
variables are used often as proxies for financial condition
in both financial and technology research (e.g., [14, 25, 43,
59]). Revenue generation is a binary term that signifies that
the firm has produced revenue. ROA is derived by dividing
net income by total assets. Net income and total assets are
not used as proxies for financial condition in our analyses,
but rather we use ROAwhich is a common variable found in
this type of analysis. In addition to our other proxies for
financial condition, we would have liked to have examined
return on equity, however, for too many firms this indicator
would have been undefined due to their negative worth prior
to going public.
We control for the firm’s age and retained equity.
Retained equity signifies the percentage amount of common
stock the pre-IPO owners will continue to own. We use
retained equity as a control variable because this can act as
a signal to potential investors regarding pre-IPO owners’
commitment to the firm. Data for each firm’s offer price,
SIC code, age, retained equity, revenue generation, net
income, total assets, stockholder’s equity, research and de-
velopment expense, and IPO date were collected from the
IPO’s prospectus as filed with the SEC and found on its
website (www.sec.gov). Data related to revenue generation,
net income, total assets, and research and development
expense are from the audited financial statements within
the prospectus and represent data for the most recent year
prior to the IPO. The “age” variable is an approximation
based on the year. We added 1 year to each IPO as we found
one or more firms that were forming at the time of the IPO
(i.e., they had only incorporated a few months before). For
the firms that delisted, we include their information up until
the time of their delisting. A small number of firms that
delisted resumed trading over the counter as “penny stocks.”
We do not include over-the-counter information in this
study.
There are two variables related to intermediaries: venture
capital involvement and underwriter reputation. These are
dichotomous variables. Firms and individuals that invested
in biopharmaceutical firms prior to the IPO were cross-
matched with Pratt’s Guide to Venture Capital Sources
[60] to determine venture capital involvement. For under-
writers, we rank the lead underwriter using the “tombstone”
underwriter reputation ranks provided by Carter, Dark, and
Singh [61]. For the few underwriters within our study not
ranked by Carter, Dark, and Singh [61], we use the Carter
and Manaster [62] tombstone method to determine the
underwriter’s ranking.
We use delisting of the firm’s stock with a major ex-
change as a proxy for firm survival. Delisted firms file with
the SEC a termination of securities statement. We use this
statement to determine delistings (along with noting the
missing 31 December 2007 stock price variable) and then
review other SEC filings to calculate years from IPO to
termination of securities or delisting (survival).
Results
Table 1 presents summary statistics describing the data by
year. There are 215 biopharmaceutical firms in our sample,
and they received over $12.5 billion in net proceeds from
the sale of their stock during their initial public offering. Of
note, in the first 3 years (1996–1998) of our 12-year study,
the collective percentage of firms equals 25.6 % of the total
number of firms in our study, whereas the collective per-
centage of the net proceeds for these firms equals 11.8 % of
the total. In 6 years (e.g., 1999, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and
2007), the collective percentage of firms (38.1 % of the
total) corresponds roughly to the collective percentage of
net proceeds (35.1 % of the total). In 3 years (2000, 2002,
and 2006), the collective percentage of firms equals 36.3 %
of the total, whereas the collective percentage of the net
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proceeds for these firms equals 53.1 % of the total. Hence,
there is variance in biopharmaceutical IPO activity.
Table 2 presents mean financial data by year of IPO.
These data come from the audited financial statements
found in the prospectuses. In 2002, two large profitable
firms went public which given the small number of IPOs
for this year (N05) skewed the data for this year. The effect
of these two firms is also depicted in our charts. When we
exclude these two firms, the remaining three firms in 2002
have net income of −14.6 million, total revenue of 64.8
million, total assets of 182.8 million, research and develop-
ment of 18.3 million, and a ROA of −15.6. Figure 2 illus-
trates the ROA and stockholder’s equity for these firms in
the year prior to their IPO. Given this, when we examine
Table 2 and Fig. 2 together, we begin to see that the financial
condition of these firms appears to be deteriorating over the
course of the study confirming our hypothesis (H7b).
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations
for the variables in our models. Due to outliers, we trim 14
of the 215 firms leaving us with 201 firms within our overall
sample and 149 drug firms or 93.5 and 94.3 % of our initial
samples, respectively. Within Table 3, there are correlations
between first-day mispricing and net proceeds only, and this
relationship is negative. However, there are positive corre-
lations between net proceeds and retained equity, research
and development, ROA, venture capital involvement, and
underwriter reputation. There is a negative correlation be-
tween net proceeds and stockholder equity. Included in
Table 3 are the correlations for percentage change in stock
price in the third year (i.e., a long-term variable (H7a)). This
variable correlates only with net proceeds and age of the
firm at the time of the IPO.
Table 4 presents the results from the multiple regression
analyses. The second column shows that the age of the firm













1996 24 0.112 717,404 0.057 29,891 5.8
1997 23 0.107 567,563 0.045 24,676 8.6
1998 8 0.037 200,498 0.016 25,062 7.6
1999 11 0.051 590,975 0.047 53,725 8.4
2000 50 0.233 3,994,735 0.318 79,894 7.0
2001 5 0.023 320,700 0.025 64,140 6.0
2002 5 0.023 736,251 0.059 147,250 8.8
2003 5 0.023 303,400 0.024 60,680 7.8
2004 27 0.126 1,465,073 0.116 54,261 8.3
2005 14 0.065 733,517 0.058 52,394 7.1
2006 23 0.107 1,934,978 0.154 84,129 9.7
2007 20 0.093 1,015,800 0.081 50,790 8.2
Total 215 100 12,580,895 100 58,516 7.7
Table 2 Mean financial
indicators prior to IPO
N0215 totals are based
on all data, not yearly means;
ROA0net income/total assets
ROA return on assets
Year Net income Total revenue Total assets R&D spending ROA Stockholder’s equity
1996 −4,944,830 5,382,924 22,849,338 5,374,949 −0.438 8,025,000
1997 −5,686,102 4,761,448 11,302,065 4,893,740 −1.544 4,324,000
1998 −7,771,388 12,917,985 25,828,656 3,245,632 −1.202 6,138,000
1999 −8,664,953 8,497,419 33,567,838 10,113,488 −2.181 23,321,000
2000 −12,221,155 16,450,268 38,368,458 10,467,934 −0.936 −2,202,000
2001 −15,673,496 35,433,402 49,054,671 6,420,547 −0.950 11,828,000
2002 8,773,362 100,707,343 158,915,794 18,459,497 0.462 3,104,000
2003 −29,783,870 1,097,071 36,113,769 13,026,547 −1.184 −59,895,000
2004 −57,908,620 17,357,379 50,559,508 17,716,472 −2.223 −50,161,000
2005 −27,576,092 12,171,484 40,812,867 16,143,245 −2.565 −50,958,000
2006 −40,962,847 34,392,899 167,409,508 17,205,654 −0.620 −25,681,000
2007 −25,392,420 61,77,579 41,395,945 18,714,222 −0.844 −37,054,000
Total −18,984,368 16,269,115 51,804,073 11,935,175 −0.337 −14,589,000
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is the only variable of statistical significance that explains
underpricing for all firms (N0201). To assist with interpre-
tation of the data, a natural log transformation was per-
formed on several of the variables producing log normal
distributions. To assess the potential multicollinearity issue,
a variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis was performed.
The results were VIF values below 2.0 for all variables
which are well within the cutoff threshold of having VIF
values of 10 or less. We also checked for homoscedasticity
(i.e., the variance of errors is the same across all independent
variables) by plotting the standardized residuals (the errors)
by regression’ predicted value. Residuals were fairly scat-
tered around the horizontal line indicating little issue with
heteroscedasticity.
The fourth column of Table 4 shows that there are no
relationships between underpricing and our financial,
intermediaries, or control variables for drug firms. Thus,
many of our hypotheses related to underpricing (e.g., H1,
H3a, H3b, H5a, and H6a) are not supported. These results are
the same whether we are examining all firms (N0201) or
drug firms only (N0149). As noted in Table 4, these varia-
bles explain very little of the variance of underpricing (e.g.,
6.5 and 4.1 %, respectively).
We find very different results when we examine the net
proceeds going to firms. For all firms (N0201), two of our
four financial indicators show a significant relationship with
net proceeds. These are R&D expenditures and ROA. Sim-
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exception of revenue also having a statistically significant
relationship with net proceeds. We believe that these results
verify our hypothesis related to financial variables and net
proceeds (e.g., H2), suggesting that firms in better financial
condition receive more net proceeds. Our findings related to
net proceeds and R&D expenditures verifies our hypotheses
(e.g., H4a and H4b), suggesting that firms that spend more on
R&D in the year prior to the IPO are able to raise a greater
amount of funds for further R&D than firms that spend a
lesser amount of funds on R&D in the year prior to the IPO.
The old adage that one has to spend money to make money
appears to apply in this setting.
We found mixed results related to our intermediaries. The
findings do not support our hypotheses about venture cap-
italists being associated with higher underpricing (e.g., H5a)
or net proceeds (H5b). Nor were underwriters with greater
reputations associated with higher amounts of underpricing
(H6a). However, more prestigious underwriters were associ-
ated with IPOs that raised a greater amount of net proceeds
(H6b).
Taken together, our findings suggest that public mar-
ket investors do not place more emphasis on financial
indicators or intermediaries when determining the price
at which to buy the stock of an IPO than do premarket
investors. However, certain financial variables and un-
derwriter reputation do play a role when determining
the total amount that a firm can raise in an IPO. Firms
that generate revenue and spend more on R&D are able
to raise a greater amount of funding for all firms, and
drug firms in particular. Our model explains 34.8 % of
the variance of net proceeds for all firms and 33.6 % of
the variance of net proceeds for drug firms.
This paper also has an interest in long-term performance
and survivability related to these variables. We test this
interest by using firms from the years 1996 through the
end of 2004. One hundred fifty-eight firms went public
during this time. The last two columns of Table 4 begin to
address this. The second to the last column shows the
multiple regression results related to percentage change of
stock price at year 3 on all firms that survived 3 years (N0
122). The findings indicate that the age of the firm at the
time of the IPO and its ability to generate revenue are the
only variables related to 3-year percentage changes in stock
price. Thus, our hypothesis (e.g., H7a) is supported in a very
limited manner.
The last column in Table 4 shows the results of our logistic
regression related to our variables and overall survivability.
This relates to our hypothesis (e.g., H8a) regarding pre-IPO
financial condition and the ability to survive. We do not
include firms from 2005, 2006, and 2007 in this analysis.
Our sample includes 121 firms. In logistic regression when
analyzing overall model fit, it is important to examine several
statistical tests together. Given this, the results show that the
model does not fit the data very well. This is indicated by a
Model χ208.230 (p00.411), a −2 Log likelihood0109.465, a
Hosmer and Lemeshow test07.057 (p0 .530), and RL
20
0.070. All tests indicate a poor fit of the model to the data.
Similarly, there are no statistically significant relationships
among our independent variables and firm survival. The pre-
sentation of the Wald statistics in Table 4 signifies this, as do
Table 4 Multivariate and logistic regression results
























Age 0.146a −0.037 0.167 −0.023 0.253b 2.037
Equity retained 0.081 0.117 0.037 0.168a −0.044 1.667
Revenue −0.137 −0.085 −0.044 −0.162a 0.290b 1.050
R&D expenditures (log) 0.039 0.225b −0.040 0.266b 0.174 0.308
ROA −0.011 0.174b −0.020 0.171a 0.187 0.007
Shareholder equity −0.102 −0.077 −0.055 −0.142 −0.047 0.006
Venture capital −0.070 −0.024 0.007 −0.097 0.010 2.284
Underwriter reputation −0.134 0.384b −0.109 0.319b −0.117 2.326
N 201 201 149 149 122 121
R2 0.065 0.348 0.041 0.336 0.153 0.070c
Coefficient estimates are standardized
a Significant at the 0.05 level
b Significant at the 0.01 level
c Statistic represents RL
2
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the logistic regression coefficients (not shown). We also ran
stepwise logistic regression and found similar results (not
shown).
To understand financial condition and survival further,
we follow Peristiani and Hong’s [16] example for all US
IPOs. We perform a Cox regression model that allows us to
explain the influence of explanatory variables in the survi-
vor and hazard function. The dependent variable is the
conditional probability that the biopharmaceutical IPO will
delist given that it has not delisted previously. Following
Peristiani and Hong [16], we use ROA to gauge its financial
condition. We analyze all firms (N0198) and the subset of
firms from the years 1996 through 2004 (N0139). We find
similar results for both analyses. To be consistent with our
previous logistic regression analysis, we present results re-
lated to firms that went public between 1996 through 2004
(N0139). Fifty-eight or 41.7 % of the firms did not survive
(i.e., they delisted). Figure 3 graphs the survival of biophar-
maceutical IPOs for different levels of pre-IPO financial
condition. The top half of Fig. 3 shows the survival function
at the mean of the covariates whereas the bottom half
illustrates the data divided into quartiles. Our analysis of
the mean indicates a poor fitting model (χ201.321, p0
0.250, and a −2 Log likelihood0378.908), with our analysis
of the quartiles producing similar results (not shown). Our
analysis provides a Wald coefficient01.315 (p00.252). Our
quartile analysis of ROA also provides nonstatistically sig-
nificant results (not shown). Interestingly, the quartile study
shows that although not statistically significant, the firms in
the 2nd and 4th ROA quartile survived on average longer
than those firms in the 1st and 3rd quartile. In addition,
when we substitute any of the other three variables used as
proxies for financial condition (e.g., revenue generation,
research and development expenditures, or stockholder’s
equity), we get similar results (not shown). Thus, taken
together with our logistic regression results, financial con-
dition prior to the IPO does not appear to be a good indicator
of survival. Thus, our hypothesis (e.g., H8a) regarding firm
Fig. 3 Survival analysis
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survival being associated with the financial condition of the
firm at the time of the IPO is not supported.
We also perform a second Cox regression model to
address our hypothesis (e.g., H8b) regarding firm survival
and amount of net proceeds raised (N0139). The dependent
variable is the conditional probability that the biopharma-
ceutical IPO will delist given that it has not delisted previ-
ously. Net proceeds collected at the time of the IPO are used.
Again, we find no association between an independent
variable (e.g., net proceeds) and firm survival. The results
indicate that the model does not fit the data well. This is
seen by a Model χ200.532 (p00.466), a −2 Log like-
lihood0379.632, and an RL
200.001. The Wald coef-
ficient00.532 (p00.466) for net proceeds collected at the
time of the IPO. We also re-ran our logistic regression
including net proceeds collected at the time of the IPO in
our model (N0121). These results also show that the model
does not fit the data very well. This is indicated by a Model
χ207.948 (p00.539) and a −2 Log likelihood0109.747.
The Wald coefficient00.913 (p00.339) for net proceeds
collected at the time of the IPO. We find similar results
when we ran a stepwise logistic regression including all
previous independent variables and a logistic regression
with net proceeds as the only independent variable (results
not shown). Thus, our hypothesis (e.g., H8b) regarding firm
survival being associated with the amount of net proceeds
raised at the time of the IPO is not supported.
Discussion
The present paper examines the ways pre-IPO financial
indicators and intermediaries affect aftermarket performance
and survival of biopharmaceutical firms going public for the
first time between the years 1996 through 2007. We choose
biopharmaceutical firms to study due to their research in-
tensity, and the fact that this market sector has been “fuelled
by the financial community” ([63], p. 126). The findings
may be of interests to scholars of biopharmaceutical man-
agement, biopharmaceutical firms, and investors.
Overall, we find mixed results. Biopharmaceutical firms
raised over $12.5 billion during this time, with first-day
prices increasing over 16 % on average. Pre-IPO financial
indicators and intermediaries do not appear, however, to
play a significant role in predicting this mispricing or the
firm’s survival. On the other hand, several indicators do play
a significant role in explaining the amount a firm is able to
raise during the IPO and its 3-year stock performance for
surviving firms. Of note, R&D spending prior to the IPO is
significantly related to the amount of net proceeds collected.
This is to say that aftermarket investors do not appear to
place much value on financial indicators and intermediaries
when deciding on the price to pay for an IPO’s stock relative
to what the underwriter pays. However, they do appear to
place great value on financial indicators (e.g., revenue gen-
eration and ROA) when deciding how much net proceeds
overall the firm can raise in an IPO.
In addition, underwriters play a significant role. Several
prestigious underwriters included in this study (e.g., Leh-
man Brothers and Bear Stearns) no longer exist in the forms
that they did during the study due to the economic crisis in
the USA and internationally. Additionally, the IPO market
has presently “dried up” for many firms [8]. Although we do
not know how long the current instability in the markets
may last, we nevertheless believe that similar factors previ-
ously affecting IPOs will be at play again and agree with
Drennen [64] that biopharmaceutical firms that focus on
innovation will continue to gain competitive advantage.
Thus, we believe that market factors including underwriter
prestige will in the future affect the amount that IPOs are
able to raise.
An explanation for our findings may be a variation of
Loughran and Ritter’s [20] use of prospect theory in this
setting. They suggest that pre-IPO investors are more toler-
ant of excessive underpricing if pre-IPO investors simulta-
neously learn about aftermarket valuation that is higher than
what they expected (i.e., as the stock price rises in the
aftermarket the pre-IPO’s investors wealth goes up by way
of the value of the stock retained). A different way of
looking at this is from the aftermarket investor’s perspec-
tive. Given the uncertainty of both the science and the IPO
market (and perhaps especially after the internet bubble),
aftermarket investors may view this market sector as pri-
marily speculative in nature and de-emphasize the financial
condition of the firm as it relates to stock price but not in
their total amount that they are willing to invest. In other
words, the aftermarket investors may discount significantly
the financial condition of the firm in relation to the amount
they are willing to pay for a given stock but not their total
dollar amount expended. This would suggest that aftermar-
ket investors are making smaller bets in firms in lesser
financial condition compared with larger bets in firms in
better financial condition.
As another explanation, we note that Leone et al. [49]
found that IPOs that were more specific in their reporting of
their use of proceeds from the IPO face lower underpricing.
Our results on net proceeds may be similar in that firms that
are spending more on R&D are able to raise greater amounts
of funds—i.e., the firms are signaling their historical use of
proceeds, and investors in this market sector wish their
investment to be spent on R&D. Thus, our findings suggest
at least three relevant points for managers (especially man-
agers of drug firms) to consider:
1. Within the IPO prospectus, other documents, and during
the IPO process itself, the firm may wish to highlight the
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use of proceeds going to R&D—firms with greater
R&D expenditures are able to raise more capital during
the IPO;
2. Similarly, it should remain focused on R&D—other
areas such as marketing and manufacturing should be
de-emphasized (outsourced?) to maintain focus on
R&D and the ability to raise capital. It is important to
notice that at this stage of development, having a pos-
itive ROA is important, but generating revenue itself is
a negative influence on the ability to raise capital. This
suggests that the markets want to see the firm focused
on R&D and should they generate revenue (few do),
that they are efficient with this revenue generation (e.g.,
positive ROA);
3. Although our venture capital variable is nonsignificant,
prior to engaging venture capitalists entrepreneurs may
wish to ask the venture capitalists which underwriters
they typically use. Venture capitalists have preferences
for underwriters, and this may affect the overall amount
raised in an IPO if the venture capitalists network with
less reputable underwriters.
There are several limitations to our study. First, we
focus on biopharmaceutical firms and do not know if our
results are generalized to other high-technology firms or
other firms in general. Second, we use delisting as our
proxy for survival. This does not take into consideration
that firms in our study may have been acquired as
opposed to some other survival proxy such as bankrupt-
cy. This is especially important given the widespread use
of strategic alliances in this market sector. Thus, some
poor-performing firms may have delisted due to financial
condition whereas strategic alliance partners or other
firms may have acquired some promising firms. This
may be one explanation of the nonsignificant findings
related to amount raised and survival. Third, it would
be helpful to know if all shares of stock offered were
sold during the IPO. This would further shed light on the
issue related to financial condition and net proceeds
collected (i.e., were firms in better financial condition
able to sell all shares of stock compared to those in a
state of lesser financial condition). Fourth, we would like
to know what effect, if any, nonfinancial variables (e.g.,
stage of clinical trials, number of strategic alliances, and
CEO background) have on our dependent variables. Finally,
primary research is needed to understand how biopharmaceut-
ical firms and investors view the relationships between pre-
IPO financial condition and our dependent variables.
In conclusion, our findings suggest that financial condi-
tion does not affect the mispricing or underpricing of the
firms. However, several financial indicators and having
prestigious underwriters do play a significant role in terms
of amount of capital raised. Additionally, firms that spent a
greater amount on R&D were correlated with raising greater
amounts of capital, suggesting that investors greatly value
R&D expenditures in this market sector in terms of amount
raised. Our results should assist biopharmaceutical firms,
researchers, and investors understand the role these factors
play in the IPO process.
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